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Abstract 
Financial incentives are used by natural resource management organisations to encourage landholders to 
adopt sustainable practices where the outcomes on a farm scale may be negative or marginal. There is a 
growing body of research aimed at understanding why landholders do or do not agree to participate in 
financial incentive programs, however research that considers when and how financial incentives work 
to bring about long-term behaviour change is relatively immature. The purpose of this review is to 
answer the question ‘What factors influence the effectiveness of financial incentives on long-term 
natural resource management practice change?’ In synthesising the evidence, it was found that there are 
numerous characteristics of the practice change itself, along with the program design and 
implementation, which are important to understand long-term behaviour change. These include whether 
inexpensive maintenance or long-term funding is available; whether the changes are relatively simple to 
sustain; whether the program involves structural changes; whether there is land use rigidity; and 
whether the changes have resulting environmental benefits that are highly observable. Additionally, it is 
advisable for programs that use financial incentives to include the following program features: ongoing 
extension support and a focus on building relationship and trust; flexibility in how the practice change is 
applied; active landholder involvement from planning to evaluation; and contract length that is 
appropriate for the complexity of the NRM practice. These characteristics can be used to guide policy 
makers in their natural resource management investment decisions. There is a clear need for greatly 
increased monitoring and evaluation of existing programs, both during the program and after its 
conclusion, in order to more fully understand its long-term impacts and ultimate effectiveness. Finally, 
landholders undertaking a practice change generally benefit from ongoing support from government 
natural resource management extension officers. 
Despite a concerted effort and large sums of money dedicated towards improving 
environmental management on private land in Australia and New Zealand, there is a 
widespread view that efforts to date have not succeeded given that biodiversity, land 
and water quality continue to decline in many areas (Earl et al. 2010; Hone and Fraser 
2004). Perhaps this is not surprising, given that a large cultural shift has been taking 
place in a relatively short time – only 50 years ago governments were paying 
landholders to clear native vegetation, but now landholders can be fined for clearing 
native vegetation and are obliged through regulations and industry codes to change 
previous management practices to enhance sustainability outcomes. For example, 
landholders are expected to reduce fertiliser and effluent run-off, improve soil quality 
and reduce salinity, use water and energy efficiently, reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, and increase biodiversity through native vegetation retention (Dairy 
Electricity Advisory Program 2011; Dairy New Zealand et al. 2013) 
Additionally, landholders are under pressure from the market to produce more in 
order to feed the world’s growing human population, while at the same time pushing 
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up against resource use constraints. Producing more food from fewer resources while 
maintaining or improving current resource standards is one of the great challenges of 
the 21st century (Sachs 2015).  
 Large sums of public and private funds have been invested in agricultural research 
and development in order to meet this challenge. With ever-improving technological 
advances and increased understanding of farming practices that reduce detrimental 
environmental impacts, government bodies generally have no shortage of suggestions 
for how landholders can reduce their impact. Convincing landholders to change their 
management behavior – some of which has been taking place for generations and may 
still be socially acceptable within the local farming community – has proved more 
difficult. Long-established and internalised social norms can be difficult to change, 
and can explain why some farmers persist with practices that are less and less socially 
acceptable to broader society (Minato et al. 2010). The ‘big stick’ regulatory approach 
has met with fierce resistance in some cases. For instance, the punitive measures set 
out in the Native Vegetation Act 2003 in New South Wales have been perceived by 
some as an unfair state intrusion into private property rights and landholders’ ability to 
earn a living (Bartel 2013).  
It is a reality that most landholders are under financial pressure to make an income 
from their land, and that some of the recommended practice changes do come at a 
financial cost. Some environmental practices are costly to farmers because they take 
land out of production (such as re-vegetation), or they are costly to implement with 
minimal or no return on investment (such as the materials and labour for fencing off 
riparian zones) (Aarons et al. 2013; Jeffrey et al. 2014). Sustainable practices that do 
bring about some production benefit or save landholders time and money are often 
adopted by landholders voluntarily. No-till farming and water efficient irrigation 
systems are examples of such practices (Kaine and Bewsell 2000).  
How then to encourage landholders to voluntarily undertake practice changes on 
their private properties that might result in personal financial loss? Policymakers have 
used financial incentives as a sweetener in these circumstances, with a proliferation of 
government-run financial incentive programs in the agricultural sector across New 
Zealand, Australia, Europe, Canada, the USA and many parts of the developing world. 
Along with these programs has come a proliferation of research into human behaviour 
change and adoption theory from multiple disciplines, including economics, sociology, 
psychology, health promotion, marketing, agricultural extension, and anthropology 
(Kaine 2008; Pannell et al. 2006).  
Review purpose 
The current review was undertaken against this background. In particular, this review 
aims to address a gap in the research, which to date has focused on understanding why 
landholders do or do not participate in these programs and what could be done to 
increase participation numbers. In contrast, this review examines the effectiveness of 
financial incentives in bringing about long-term behaviour change – in short, what 
happens when the money stops? Or the program ends? If landholders revert back to 
their old practices, and the desired ecological outcomes of the program are not met, 
then the use of the public purse to fund these programs is questionable. Consequently, 
understanding when and how financial incentives work to bring about long-term 
behaviour change is an important policy question with practical implications for what 
types of programs are funded, and how they are designed and delivered.  
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This review addresses the key question: what factors influence the effectiveness of 
financial incentives on long-term natural resource management practice change? The 
review does not consider the characteristics of landholders that participate in financial 
incentive programs aimed at behaviour change, or their perceptions of the motivations 
and barriers to their involvement (Ernst and Wallace 2008; Greiner and Gregg 2011). 
Nor does it include models or simulations of how hypothetical market trading schemes 
may operate and how best to design them (Sinner et al. 2012).  
How to define ‘financial incentives’? 
This review interprets ‘financial incentives’ in a broad sense. We consider evidence 
related to a variety of financial instruments, including competitive tenders and 
auctions, stewardship payments, subsidies, and grants. The evidence used in this 
review involves a variety of different financial incentives schemes internationally, 
some major schemes being Market Based Instruments (or MBIs, generally from 
Australia), cost sharing (generally from the USA), Agri-Environmental Schemes (or 
AES, generally from Europe) and Payment for Ecosystem Services (or PES, generally 
from the USA, Latin America and Africa).  
How to define ‘long-term’? 
Only one study (Race and Curtis 2009) considers the definition of ‘long-term’ in the 
context of NRM practice change. The authors state that the recommended NRM 
practice needs to become largely a ‘stand-alone’ with no need for substantial external 
support, and be an integral component of the property’s management. The study 
suggests that once the land-use practice has become established, ‘long-term’ could be 
defined as a period of 10 years, although this would depend on the particular practice 
implemented and the ecosystem in which it is taking place (Race and Curtis 2013). 
Methodology  
One of the key points of difference between a traditional narrative literature review 
and undertaking a systematic review is the reduction of potential bias in the 
conclusions that are drawn from the review. This is achieved through: 
• the development of an a priori search protocol documenting the search terms 
and phrases, search sources, the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and any 
conflicts of interest; 
• transparent documentation of how the relevance of information returned from 
the search process is assessed; 
• an assessment of the quality of evidence items;  
• transparent documentation of the extraction of the relevant evidence from 
studies using a data extraction table. 
We have undertaken all of these processes in this review, with the search protocol, 
search terms and results, and an abbreviated and combined data extraction and quality 
assessment table included as appendices.  
Evidence items were searched for from a wide variety of sources, including online 
databases containing peer reviewed journals, and databases containing grey literature. 
Databases searched were Science Direct, Wiley, JSTOR, DOAJ, TROVE and the 
search engines Google and Google Scholar. 
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The following search phrases were used in these databases and search engines: 
1. (‘market based instruments’ OR ‘market based incentives’) AND adoption AND 
(‘long term’ OR ‘endurance of change’ OR ‘drop out’) AND (agricult* OR 
‘natural) 
2. (‘financial incentives’ OR ‘economic incentives’ OR ‘incentive program’ OR 
‘monetary incentives’) AND (landholder OR farmer OR ‘land manager’ OR 
landowner OR ‘primary producer’) AND (adop* OR effectiveness) AND 
(biodiversity OR conservation) 
3. (‘cost share’ OR ‘fixed grant’ OR ‘financial grant’ OR ‘capital grant’ OR ‘financial 
payment’) AND (evaluation OR program) AND (biodiversity OR conservation) 
4. (‘direct grant’ OR ‘fixed price grant’) AND (biodiversity OR conservation) 
5. (‘agri-environmen* program’ OR ‘agri-environmen* payment’ OR ‘agri-
environmen*scheme’) AND (‘behavi*r change’ OR ‘practice change’ OR adopt*) 
Given that only one evidence item from New Zealand was located in these initial 
searches, we undertook targeted searches to discover whether relevant New Zealand 
literature was available. This involved searching the publications sections of the 
websites of Department of Conservation and Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Additionally, leading New Zealand researchers from the following 
organisations were personally contacted: 
• AgResearch 
• Cawthorn Institute  
• Landcare Research 
• Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 
• Ministry of Primary Industries 
As a result of this initial search, a total of 152 evidence items were deemed relevant 
based on their title and abstract. The full text of these evidence items was then 
assessed in accordance with the inclusion/exclusion criteria outlined in the search 
protocol (see Appendix 1). In summary, the inclusion criteria involved studies of 
landholders who had voluntarily participated in a government program that offered 
financial incentives and involved a practice change. The exclusion criteria applied to 
studies undertaken in locations and situations with very different economic and social 
circumstances to New Zealand and Australia. Other exclusion criteria applied to 
studies that assessed participation factors, sociodemographic characteristics, and 
attitudinal factors without assessing behaviour or future intentions at the cessation of 
program funding. Furthermore, expert opinion items that did not analyse actual 
landholder participation in a program were excluded, along with theoretical economic 
models and hypothetical preference surveys.  
After removing duplicates and studies that did not meet the inclusion criteria (n = 
107), a total of 42 studies were identified, and the relevant data and quality assessment 
information from these studies extracted into a literature matrix (see Appendix 2). 
These 42 studies were used as the evidence to answer the review question. 
Review limitations 
As discussed above, there is a substantial body of evidence on the demographics and 
characteristics of landholders who sign up to programs promoting sustainable practices 
5 Evidence Base 
 
that include a financial incentive component. There is also a substantial body of 
evidence on what motivates landholders to be involved in these programs and any 
barriers to involvement.  
There were surprisingly few studies of high quality that examined whether 
behaviour change had continued and environmental conditions had changed some 
years after the conclusion of a sustainability program involving financial incentives. 
Most studies discussed landholders’ future intentions on the basis of interview or survey 
responses. While somewhat informative, an intention to do something in the future does 
not mean that it will necessarily happen. Often our review question was not the central 
focus of the studies included in the review, with study methods being limiting at times 
because they were not designed to examine long-term commitment to sustainable 
practices.  
A further issue with the study methods was that the majority of the studies relied 
entirely on survey results from landholders who had participated in a sustainability 
program using financial incentives (Fisher and Pakula 2010; Gustafson and Hill 1993; 
Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramírez 2011; Mendham et al. 2007; Moon and Cocklin 2011; 
Page and Bellotti 2015; Race and Curtis 2009). While surveys are commonly used in 
social sciences and are appropriate for this topic, more rigour could have been applied 
to the studies using surveys in order to decrease the possibility of confounding 
variables. For example, replication and a control group were used in only one of the 
surveys (Crabb et al. 2000), while only two studies coupled their survey with site visits 
or satellite images to verify whether structural and environmental changes noted in 
surveys had in fact occurred (Duncan et al. 2014; Jackson-Smith et al. 2010). Given 
that landholders have been found to overestimate the success of their projects, on-site 
evaluations are a necessary element of a robust study design (Cotching and Sims 2000; 
Jacobson et al. 2003; Kammin et al. 2009). 
Very few studies assessed various components within a financial incentive program 
or differences between financial incentive mechanisms using appropriate experimental 
design. The available evidence to answer this review question is immature, signaling 
that more research is required, along with monitoring and evaluation of programs.  
Commonly reported factors that do not necessarily demonstrate long-
term practice change 
A small number of empirical studies examined the long-term adoption of NRM 
practices, or the long-term ecological impacts upon the cessation of a financial 
incentive program. Other factors (listed below) were more prominent in the literature, 
and could be easily mistaken for signals of long-term practice change. While such 
indicators may indeed assist the occurrence of long-term practice change, it would be 
unwise to assume that long-term change has occurred or will occur based on their 
presence. These factors are:  
• Landholder knowledge has increased. Many surveys asked participating 
landholders whether their knowledge about a particular sustainability practice 
had increased as a result of the program. While increased awareness of NRM 
best practices is a vital component of behaviour change, it alone will not ensure 
that the change is long-term. Landholders lacking the financial resources or 
physical capability to undertake change may continue with their old practices 
(Tennent and Lockie 2013).  
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• Landholders express an intention to continue the practice in the long-term. It 
was common for studies to mention survey results such as ‘Eighty seven percent 
of participants expressed a long-term commitment to managing their areas after 
funding from the RLS Sustainable Agriculture Project ceased’ (Earl et al. 2005, 
18). While positive that participants had such intentions, external forces can 
negate the best of landholder intentions to continue the practice in the long-term. 
For example, a landholder who committed to increasing biodiversity by 
participation in a tree-planting program may not be able to continue the required 
maintenance of these areas due to economic or physical constraints (Race and 
Curtis 2013). Relying purely on such statements in a survey without a follow up 
survey years later, ideally including a site visit, poses considerable risks for 
decision making. 
• A program has high participation rates. This is a key traditional indicator of 
program success, but it does not necessarily illustrate the quality of achieved 
environmental benefits, or whether they resulted in long-term landholder 
behaviour change (Wilson and Hart 2001). While certainly helpful in ensuring 
that at least some landholders continue with the practice, it is no guarantee of 
this. For example, if landholders regard the payment as unfairly low for the work 
that they do, they will be unlikely to continue the practice when the contract, 
project or payments cease (Race and Curtis 2013).  
• A land use or practice has changed in the short-term. A change does not 
necessarily reflect a commitment to the NRM practice. It could be a pragmatic 
business decision to access additional resources that may or may not continue to 
be implemented in the long-term (Race and Curtis 2013). 
Features of the practice change that aid long-term behaviour change 
There is a stronger likelihood that the NRM practice will be maintained over the long-
term if the practice change that the financial incentive is targeting has the following 
features. 
It is inexpensive to maintain or there is long-term funding available 
Selecting practices that do not require significant ongoing funding (or selecting 
program participants with appropriate financial resources and interest) is important if 
there is an expectation that landholders continue with the practice once the program 
and government funded financial incentive ends. Ferraro and Burnside (2000) discuss 
this in their evaluation of the WEST 2000 Rural Partnership Program, in the context of 
rabbit and woody weed control in NSW. There is little environmental benefit in 
providing one-off or short-term payments to landholders to undertake pest control if 
they do not have the personal financial resources to continue undertaking the control 
in the long-term (Ferraro and Burnside 2001). This was also an issue in Colombia for 
small-holder farmers who could not afford to buy fertilisers to maintain the 
silvopastoral system once the payments for ecosystem services ceased (Hayes 2012). 
With programs where landholders are expected to fund a portion of the structural or 
ongoing management costs, it is important that government agencies use the most 
efficient and effective ways to implement the practice change, and that they do not 
underestimate the implementation costs. Getting this wrong can cause much distress 
among landholders, as well as damage program reputation and trust (Storz 2008). 
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Certain practices may require ongoing financial incentives if they are to continue to 
be undertaken in the long-term. This was the case in a study of landholders involved in 
Agri-Evironmental Schemes in Switzerland. Those undertaking organic farming were 
generally reliant on direct payments to subsidise the cost of the numerous controls and 
income loss arising from the restrictions it entailed, and many indicated that they 
would abandon organic farming if subsidies ceased (Karali et al. 2014).  
Such dependence on ongoing financial incentives may be more appropriate in some 
countries than in others. In an Australian context, landholders involved in a tendering 
system for native biodiversity protection were concerned about the permanence of 
government funding for purchasing biodiversity services, given short funding cycles 
and inevitable changes in policy and budget priorities due to political cycles (Race and 
Curtis 2009). A major limitation of programs based on market instruments such as 
competitive tenders or auctions are that payments received for work done are wholly 
reliant on government funding, which is unlikely to continue in the long-term. The 
nature of the conservation work being done often means that landholders cannot pass 
on these management costs to consumers. Tennent and Lockie (2013) argue that there 
is little advantage in funding biodiversity conservation in the short-term – it is a long-
term commitment. Hence they question the logic in funding short-term schemes that 
won’t continue when government funding ceases. 
New Zealand has a history of experimentation with innovative market based 
schemes for conservation purposes, which aim to address the problem of relying on 
short-term government funding for long-term behaviour change. For example, an 
individual transferable quota on fisheries has been in operation since 1986, and has 
managed to keep fish stock numbers at sustainable levels since their crisis in the early 
1980s (Sinner et al. 2005). In 2008 New Zealand was the first country to implement an 
emissions trading scheme that includes forestry as part of its commitment to its Kyoto 
Protocol obligations. While deforestation rates have decreased since the scheme’s 
implementation, the market is still fledgling and new plantings haven’t yet occurred at 
a large scale. The main barrier to overcome is uncertainty around domestic and 
international emissions trading schemes – while uncertainty still permeates the system, 
forest owners are hesitant to make large scale, long-term investments in carbon 
forestry (Karpas and Kerr 2011).  
More recently, the Lake Taupo nitrogen cap and trade scheme was introduced in 
2011 in New Zealand, aimed at improving water quality. The first of its kind 
worldwide, the scheme operates by capping the total nitrogen emissions from 
agriculture into the lake, and creating tradeable ‘nitrogen discharge allowances’ 
(NDA). Landholders in the catchment are given some flexibility to make business 
decisions, by being able to trade their NDAs to other landholders or sell them to a 
public fund. While the market is still in its infancy, landholders are engaging with it 
and many elements of its design appear to be working, although again, initial 
uncertainty over its long-term viability has resulted in a cautious approach to 
involvement by some landholders (Duhon et al. 2015; Kerr et al. 2015).  
The environmental benefits of the practice are highly observable  
High observability of the benefits resulting from a practice that is linked to an incentive 
program has been reported as a powerful stimulus for behaviour change, as 
landholders feel that their efforts really do make a difference (Burmeister et al. 2006; 
Moon and Cocklin 2011) For landholders participating in a conservation farming 
program in Indiana, the multiple benefits of implementing and maintaining grassed 
waterways were highly observable, and worked to increase enthusiasm and 
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commitment to the practice. Observable benefits included reduced soil erosion, 
increased presence of wildlife, and enhanced aesthetic quality of the waterway 
(Reimer et al. 2012). The high observability of practices that reduced soil erosion has 
been mentioned as a motivating factor in other studies also (Van Herzele et al. 2011).  
In contrast, environmental benefits of practices aimed at reducing salinity are often 
not highly observable, because improvements require long time-scales, and observable 
landscape changes are minimal. Given that landholders often can’t determine whether 
their ongoing actions are making a difference, short-term funding for practice change 
in this area might have limited success (Pannell 2001). 
The practice is relatively simple to sustain 
The more complex an innovation or practice is, the greater the risk that the behaviour 
change will not be sustained in the long-term (Läpple 2010; Morris et al. 2000; Oja 
2008) For example, landholders in the CS Scheme found that the field margins option 
was difficult to understand, introduce and maintain, and as a result this was one of the 
least successful options in terms of uptake, implementation and continuation of 
practice (Morris et al. 2000). It is important that appropriate levels of support are 
provided with financial incentive activities to build the capacity and confidence of 
landholders, particularly in the first year of the program when learning curves 
associated with the new practice are high (Läpple 2010; Cattaneo 2003). 
The practice involves structural changes and land use rigidity 
A number of studies found that land use rigidity, resulting from fixed and irreversible 
conversion or transaction costs, has an effect on whether land is reverted to pre-
financial incentive management (Crabb et al. 2000; Hayes 2012; Johnson et al. 1997; 
Roberts and Lubowski 2007; Sullivan et al. 2004). For example, some investments 
such as fencing or tree planting are not easily reversible – removing them requires an 
input of time and money. In contrast, practice changes involving daily management 
practices are more easily reversed. 
This was highlighted in a study that evaluated ongoing landholder use of best 
management practices after government funded projects in the USA. They found that 
over 80 per cent of structural and planting practices were still in the field, while less 
than half of the management practices were still actively being used by project 
respondents (Jackson-Smith et al. 2010).  
Features of the project design and delivery that aid long-term behaviour 
change 
There is a stronger likelihood that the NRM practice will be maintained over the long-
term if the project design and delivery of the program with the financial incentive has 
the following characteristics: 
Ongoing extension support, relationship building, and trust 
Many studies found that landholders placed high value on ongoing support from NRM 
organisations (Boyer and Heath 2009; Burmeister et al. 2006; Mendham et al. 2007; 
Morris et al. 2000; Schenk et al. 2007; Wilson and Hart 2001). On-farm visits and 
follow-up from knowledgeable individuals aid in assisting landholders to meet the 
program’s ecological aims, particularly because discussions and information transfer 
have relevance to the landholders’ actual circumstances (Kammin et al. 2009; Schenk 
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et al. 2007). Given the importance of extension support in assisting with long-term 
change, NRM organisations should resist the temptation to cut extension funding or set 
work targets that are too high for program staff to achieve. Such actions can result in 
poor quality or non-existent long-term support for landholders, make dis-adoption of 
the practice more likely, and negate the years of effort and large sums of money put 
into sustainable agriculture programs (Mendham et al. 2007).  
Additionally, a strong relationship of trust between landholders and NRM bodies 
has been found to be crucial in order to achieve large scale involvement and behaviour 
change (Emtage and Herbohn 2012). This relationship can help landholders move past 
the initial ‘honeymoon’ period of enthusiasm and commit to the long-term input that 
the practice change involves (Race and Curtis 2013). Extension support brings with it 
important ongoing advisory, information and support services, which can provide a 
much needed boost to waning landholder motivation, especially with regard to long-
term expensive land-use change (Hayes 2012; Mendham et al. 2007; Race and Curtis 
2013; Zammit 2013).  
There is flexibility in how the practice change is applied  
A common finding in the literature was the necessity for flexibility in how landholders 
can apply the desired NRM practice to their property. Three key reasons were 
provided for its importance: firstly, flexibility enables adaptive management. If a 
financial incentive mechanism is too rigid (e.g. some Payment for Ecosystem Services 
contracts), this can impinge on landholders’ capacity to adaptively manage the natural 
resource in the face of changing ecological, social and economic conditions (Hayes et 
al. 2014; Storz 2008). For example, with some conservation auctions, landholders 
have underestimated the work required in actions such as pest control. Fixed and 
binding agreements were difficult to meet as the level of pests was higher than 
originally anticipated. Without flexibility, landholders in such circumstances felt that 
they were being underpaid for their efforts and had little desire to continue with the 
practice at the conclusion of the agreement (Race and Curtis 2013). 
Flexibility in implementation also increases ownership of conservation works, and 
encourages the formation of partnerships (Coggan and Whitten 2008; Moon and 
Cocklin 2011; Posthumus and Morris 2010) This increased involvement and 
ownership has, in some cases, led to a greater amount of conservation work being 
undertaken than originally planned, and a willingness to continue with the 
conservation work at the conclusion of the agreement (Coggan and Whitten 2008). 
Flexibility in the incentive mechanism (perhaps through providing multiple 
mechanisms) enables NRM bodies to cater for different landholder needs. For 
instance, some landholders would prefer money to support the cost of materials, while 
others with less farming experience and high off-farm income may need ‘know-how’ 
or technical support. Financial incentives need to be flexible enough so they can be 
tailored to meet these different needs. A fixed grant offering a single payment rate to 
all participating landholders may ‘under-invest’ in some landholders by being 
insufficient to sustain their commitment over the long-term, and ‘over invest’ in other 
landholders by exceeding the level of support needed to ensure their long-term 
commitment (Race and Curtis 2013). 
Overall, a flexible program can help to make the promoted conservation change 
more palatable to those implementing it on the ground. This has been the experience 
of the Lake Taupo Nitrogen cap and trade scheme in New Zealand. There has not been 
large scale, sustained landholder backlash against the scheme because its flexibility 
allows for intensification of land use (which ensures that those on undeveloped land 
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are not disadvantaged), and the trading mechanisms allow landholders to sell credits 
and a trust fund to be established (Kerr et al. 2015). 
However, there is a risk that increased flexibility can lead to low additionality (i.e. a 
small effect when the intervention is compared to a baseline) and some recommended practice 
changes not being adopted, particularly if they do not provide obvious private benefits 
(Posthumus and Morris 2010; Moon and Cocklin 2011) 
Active landholder involvement from planning to evaluation 
Actively engaging landholders in the planning and implementation of the NRM 
practice has been shown to improve their knowledge, skills, confidence, and 
commitment to sustainable farming practices (Boyer and Heath 2009; Burton et al. 
2008; Wilson and Hart 2001). Often landholder commitment to the project is stronger 
because they have an increased sense of ownership as a result of their involvement 
(Posthumus and Morris 2010). Programs that do not require a lot of active landholder 
involvement, such as zoning off land for conservation, are less likely to result in long-
term behaviour change (Burton et al. 2008). 
Active involvement in monitoring and evaluation is also important, as landholders 
are required to observe and record the application and impacts of the practice. This 
step in the process is highly influential on whether the landholder perceives any 
benefit of the practice and therefore whether they will continue to undertake it in the 
long-term (Morris et al. 2000). Indeed, a landholder’s belief that a practice change is 
of both financial and ecological value can certainly assist in that change being 
implemented in the long term.  
Informal monitoring and the reporting of observations by landholders have also 
been found to be useful in increasing landholder awareness and enthusiasm. For 
example, under a BushTender management agreement, landholders were required to 
submit an annual report, reporting against the progress of management actions 
outlined in their agreement. While being a requirement to trigger the next payment, 
this annual reporting also increased landholder awareness of changes that had occurred 
on their site and created an opportunity for landholders to be aware of their 
achievements and share them with others (Burmeister et al. 2006).  
Contract length appropriate for the complexity of the NRM practice 
Compliance with incentive conditions has been found to increase over time, and it has 
been suggested that this is related to improvements in landholder understanding and 
capacity as they go through the ‘learning curve.’ (Burmeister et al. 2006; Cattaneo 
2003). Programs and support therefore need to be of a duration appropriate to the 
complexity of the practices. If they are too short, there is a higher likelihood that the 
practice change will not continue in the long-term. 
Possible undesired outcomes from programs using financial incentives 
A number of possible unintended outcomes may arise from the use of financial 
incentives, according to the evidence base. 
Crowding out 
‘Crowding out’, a relatively recent theory, suggests that providing financial incentives 
to landholders to undertake a practice for the public good (such as protection of native 
vegetation for increased biodiversity) can ‘crowd out’ their intrinsic motivation for 
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undertaking that practice. The financial incentive changes their belief that they have a 
duty to undertake that practice and they start to demand payment for it.  
In a literature review of studies assessing the crowding out phenomenon, Rode et 
al. (2013) found several studies that suggested the existence of a motivation crowding 
out effect with financial incentives for biodiversity protection (Rode et al. 2013). They 
claim that small positive incentives can lead to an overall adverse effect, and 
recommend NRM bodies to ‘pay enough or don’t pay at all’ (Andrews et al. 2013; 
Rode et al. 2013). It is important to assess existing intrinsic motivations of program 
participants prior to large scale implementation of a program. Doing so can assist in 
determining whether crowding out has occurred at a later date due to the program 
(Andrews et al. 2013; Rode et al. 2014).  
It is worth noting that Rode et al. (2013) warned that the evidence in support of 
crowding out is inconclusive. They found methodological limitations for the empirical 
studies in their literature review that demonstrated a crowding out effect. These 
included a lack of adequate baseline information regarding pre-existing intrinsic 
motivations, and weak comparability of results of case studies due to inconsistent 
terminology and methods. 
There is evidence of financial incentives not producing a crowding out effect. In 
their study of 71 landholders in south eastern Australia, Duncan et al. (2014) found 
that landholders who had recently been subsidised for a project were more likely to 
have later completed unsubsidised work. This indicates that, at least in terms of 
medium-term economic impact, the large increase in public subsidies did not diminish 
privately funded activity, as might be expected according to the theory of crowding 
out (Duncan et al. 2014).  
With ‘crowding out’ being a recent theory with few high quality studies supporting 
it, it is more a possibility to be aware of than a solid reason not to pursue financial 
incentive programs. 
Low additionality 
A frequently cited problem with financial incentive programs is that they can provide 
low additionality, or only marginal benefits. Low additionality can also occur when 
participants may have already been undertaking a similar practice before enrolling in 
the program, or would have undertaken it irrespective of funding. Evaluation surveys 
have often determined that a significant proportion of landholders that receive 
financial incentives were already undertaking the same or similar practices (Crabb et 
al. 2000; Earl et al. 2005; Gustafson and Hill 1993; Kaljonen 2006; Posthumus and 
Morris 2010; Storz 2008; Windle et al. 2007). 
In situations where the practice would have been implemented without a financial 
incentive, the financial incentive may represent some additionality in that it can reduce 
timescales for the work to occur and enable landholders to receive guidance (Earl et al. 
2005; Fisher and Pakula 2010; Moon and Cocklin 2011). If the practice is already 
occurring then it may enable landholders to increase the amount of land that is subject 
to practice change or investment, or it can result in work being undertaken to a higher 
standard (Earl et al. 2005). It can also bring about less measurable but equally 
worthwhile benefits, such as increasing the reputation of the NRM organisation and 
building relationships with landholders that can serve as a springboard into future 
NRM activities and programs. In an evaluation of a financial incentives program for 
machinery upgrades run by a Catchment Management Authority (CMA) in New South 
Wales, it was found that while 73 per cent of the applicants would have converted their 
machinery within the next five years regardless of the financial incentive, nearly half 
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of the participants have moved on to take part in other programs run by the CMA 
(Fisher and Pakula 2010).  
 Slippage 
Slippage (i.e. a reduction in the overall resource quality compared to a baseline after the 
intervention) has been documented in numerous studies (Fleming 2010; Leathers and 
Harrington 2000; Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramírez 2011; Posthumas and Morris 2010; 
Smith-Ramirez 2005; Wu 2000). It can occur in financial incentive programs, for 
example when landholders’ farmland not subject to the program is farmed more 
intensively, or previously unfarmed land is bought into production. It generally occurs 
to offset perceived or actual production losses of land subject to a financial incentive. 
For example, it was found that farmers involved in a cost share program were more 
likely to reallocate areas of their land that were under vegetation into crop production, 
which would likely have some negative environmental impacts (Lichtenberg and 
Smith-Ramírez 2011).While the effect of slippage on long-term practice change has not 
been assessed, improvements attributed to financial incentives may be offset by 
slippage to some degree and it therefore needs to be considered. 
The need for increased monitoring and evaluation 
Given the identified research gap, it is vital that monitoring and evaluation of financial 
incentive programs takes place. To begin with, a number of baseline measurements 
need to be recorded at the commencement of projects (Earl et al. 2005). Jackson-Smith 
et al. (2010) claim that there are many potential benefits to developing better tracking 
systems for post-contract implementation and long-term maintenance of best 
management practices. They found that there were many instances of practice non-
implementation and non-maintenance amongst landholders in Utah, as well as 
instances of non-contracted conservation behaviour that took place on participating 
farms. 
How to undertake such monitoring and evaluation is not without challenges. Race 
and Curtis (2013) argue that in most Australian catchment regions several instruments 
can be operating simultaneously, which makes it difficult to determine which 
individual instrument is responsible for influencing different landholder practice 
change over the long-term. They claim that the impact of one policy instrument can 
dilute or mask the contribution of another, and that study designs (such as in-depth 
qualitative research) need to be carefully developed to address this issue (Race and 
Curtis 2013). 
Strategically targeted programs for highest ecological impact 
Ultimately, the reason NRM organisations spend time and money on running 
behaviour change programs is to improve the condition and sustainability of our 
natural resources. However, with the complexity involved in engaging landholders and 
understanding how to best use financial incentives as a policy tool, it is easy to lose 
sight of this ultimate goal. Recent research into European Agricultural Environmental 
Schemes (AESs) found that few studies have examined whether AES projects have in 
fact made headway in enhancing biodiversity in the wider farm landscape, with lack of 
baseline data, monitoring and evaluation being common (Michael et al. 2014). While 
not the focus of this review (see Swann 2015 for a more detailed discussion), some 
researchers have suggested that financial incentive programs should ideally target 
landholders whose properties contain the most threatened ecosystems, or whose 
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properties are well placed strategically to deliver the biggest ecological ‘bang for 
bucks’ spent (Cooke and Moon 2015; Green and Clarkson 2006). The NSW 
government’s recent program ‘Saving Our Species’ has considered some of these 
issues, particularly through allocating threatened species to certain management 
streams based on their distribution, ecology and security.  
Conclusion 
Financial incentives are a widely accepted policy tool for use by NRM organisations, 
particularly when the sustainability practice that they are encouraging has few benefits 
to landholders at a farm scale level, or is expensive to implement or maintain. 
Government funding is vital in order for new technological advances and ecological 
understanding to be disseminated and implemented by landholders and for large scale 
ecological benefits to be realised. However, this funding can quite easily miss its mark 
and have little impact on long-term landholder behaviour change if invested in a 
poorly designed program or an inappropriate practice.  
The body of evidence is maturing with regard to the characteristics of landholders 
who sign up to government sustainability programs that offer a financial incentive, and 
their motivations and barriers for doing so. There is, however, a research gap with 
regard to the factors that influence the effectiveness of financial incentives on long-
term practice change. Very few studies assessed elements of a financial incentive 
program, or differences between financial incentive mechanisms, using appropriate 
experimental design. It was uncommon for studies to assess the impact of a program 
on long-term landholder behaviour change, or its long-term ecological impact. Given 
the considerable amount of public money being invested in these programs, it is 
imperative that these long-term impacts are studied and understood, and then used to 
guide future programs. In order for this to occur, baseline data must be gathered for 
current programs, and appropriately designed monitoring and evaluation needs to be 
undertaken during the program and after its conclusion.  
Despite this research gap, this review did find evidence that shed light on some 
influential factors that increase the likelihood of programs bringing about long-term 
landholder behaviour change. These factors can be used to guide policy decisions 
around investment and risk management. On the basis of this evidence, practice 
changes with the following features were more conducive to long-term behaviour 
change:  
• Inexpensive maintenance or long-term funding is available; 
• Changes are relatively simple to sustain and not complex; 
• Program involves structural changes and land use rigidity; 
• Changes have resulting environmental benefits that are highly observable.  
 Additionally, it is advisable that programs that use financial incentives include the 
following program features: 
• Ongoing extension support and a focus on building relationship and trust; 
• Flexibility in how the practice change is applied; 
• Active landholder involvement from planning to evaluation; 
• Contract length that is appropriate for the complexity of the NRM practice. 
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 Numerous evidence items stressed the importance of ongoing extension support 
and strong relationships between government bodies and landholders in assisting with 
long-term behaviour change. Policy makers are advised to ensure that extension 
services are adequately funded and resourced. Cutting back on funding for extension 
services can result in work targets that are too challenging to meet, and high staff 
turnovers leading to an absence of quality relationship-building with landholders, or 
long-term assistance. Without this relationship, feedback and support, landholders are 
more likely to discontinue use of the practice, negating the years of effort and large 
sums of money invested into sustainable agriculture programs.  
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Appendix 1: Search Protocol 
A set of inclusion and exclusion criteria was applied to each search to determine if 
each result should be added to the ‘admissible pool of evidence’. Each piece of 
evidence was required to pass each criterion to be included. The assessment was 
prepared using at least the abstract and sometimes, such as in the case of study type, 
using the full text. When uncertainty existed, the reviewers tended towards inclusion. 
 
The inclusion criteria applied to this search were that studies should: 
 assess the effectiveness of financial incentives in achieving the continued use of 
sustainable practices on farmland after a final payment was made to the 
landholder or after a contract to deliver environmental benefits had ended; 
 undertake an assessment of landholder intentions at the end of a contracted 
period that related to the delivery of a financial incentive; 
 involve voluntary landholder participation; 
 assess participation slippage or moral hazard in relation to financial incentives; 
and 
 assess motivations for entering into multiple or one-off payment schemes if they 
directly related to endurance of change. 
 
The exclusion criteria applied to studies that: 
 were undertaken in locations and situations where very different economic and 
social circumstances were present; 
 involved landholder participation that was not voluntary; 
 assessed participation factors without assessing behaviours/actions during and 
after cessation of funding; 
 assessed the effect that agri-environmental programs had on biophysical 
indicators at a landscape scale without assessing landholder actions; 
 solely addressed the cost effectiveness of agri-environment programs or cost-
analysis of different incentive options; 
 assessed socio-demographic characteristics, attitudinal factors (relating to 
targeting participants) but did not assess future intentions or practices during 
and/or after a program related to a financial incentive; or 
 assessed adoption factors relating to initial landholder participation only. 
 
In addition, the criteria excluded: 
 expert opinion items that did not analyse actual landholder participation; 
 hypothetical landholder choice/preference surveys; 
 quantity or market friction based market based instruments (MBIs); 
 theoretical models of moral hazard relating to economics. 
 
Some systematic reviews and literature reviews were included where these were 
highly relevant to the topic and provided important contextual information, and where 
the relevant primary source could not be located. 
A number of search strategies were used to identify relevant material. Searches 
were not restricted to any specific date range.  
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Strategy 1: Search the Collaboration for Environmental Evidence (CEE) library 
The online CEE systematic review library was searched to identify if there were any 
existing systematic reviews that would answer the search question. 
Strategy 2: Systematic search of online databases 
A systematic search of scientific databases was conducted. These searches were 
undertaken using a set of pre-defined search phrases. The databases used included the 
following types of evidence: 
1. Peer-reviewed scientific journal articles; 
2. Grey literature, including consultancy reports, government reports and theses. 
Strategy 3: Search for New Zealand based literature 
New Zealand researchers and Natural Resource Management organisations were 
contacted to find relevant research conducted in New Zealand.  
Strategy 4: Sourcing of evidence that is cited 
In cases where conclusions were drawn within the evidence that was found, and that 
cited evidence had not been found via other search strategies, attempts were made to 
source that primary evidence as opposed to relying solely on the authors’ conclusions. 
 
 Appendix 2: Literature matrix 
Table 1 Literature matrix of evidence in the review 
Study Context Key Findings Study Design Potential biases  
More robust study designs 
Burton et 
al. 2008 
Case study from Hessen, Germany and Aberdeenshire, 
Scotland. Use of a conceptual framework based on 
Bourdieu’s notions of capital we explore how farming 
activities are able to generate symbolic capital, and 
compare this with the symbolic value of conservation 
work. This examines why voluntary agri-environmental 
programs often engender minimal attitude change 
towards productivity agriculture among conventional 
farming communities 
We ﬁnd that voluntary agri-
environmental work returns little 
symbolic capital to farmers. By 
prescribing management practices 
and designating speciﬁc areas for 
agri-environmental work, farmers are 
not allowed to develop or 
demonstrate skilled role performance 
– thus inhibiting the development of 
embodied cultural capital. We 
conclude by suggesting that 
entrepreneurial production-target 
based agri-environmental schemes 
may be ultimately more effective in 
changing long-term behaviour.  
Replication - 2 geographically 
distinct sites (Germany and 
Scotland)  
Surveys - respondents selected by 
snowball methodology. 
Respondents total (n= 25) 13 
Scotland, 12 Germany. Structured 
interview using cards with images. 
Control - approx. half involved in 
AES, half not (involved in AES - 
Scotland n =8, Germany n=5)  
Small sample size. No 
before after. Only 
considers social capital. 
The suggestion that 
entrepreneurial production 
target based on AES may 
be more effective in the 
long term is more a 
suggestion than being a 
finding of the study.  
Crabb et 
al. 2000 
This study was an economic evaluation of a grant 
scheme aimed at making conservation part of normal 
farming and land management practice.  
The evaluation found that nearly two 
thirds of agreement holders definitely 
intend to re-apply at the end of their 
ten-year agreements and only 3% will 
definitely not re-apply; the remainder 
are undecided. Those definitely 
intending not to re-apply are older 
and have smaller agreements. The 
ten-year length of agreements is a 
major deterrent to renewal for the 
undecided. 
Replication - 5 distinct case study 
areas. 
Control and surveys - postal 
survey sent to 3000 non-
participating landholders in the 
case study areas, a national survey 
sent to 3000 agreement holders 
and survey of 1500 unsuccessful 
applicants to the scheme. 
Interviews (telephone and face to 
face) n=148.  
There is no independent 
verification of whether 
future intentions to re-enrol 
are actually implemented.  
  
Duncan 
et al. 
2014 
This study (undertaken in south-eastern Australia) 
attempts to determine the validity of an assumption often 
used in government reports regarding revegetation and 
fencing off native vegetation. The assumption is that 
wholly privately funded sites match publicly subsidised 
sites on a hectare for hectare basis (a so-called ‘x2’ 
assumption).  
The study found that contrary to the 
‘x2’ reporting assumption, about 75% 
of the total area of the 412 sites 
studied was from subsidised sites, and 
that proportion was far higher for the 
period after 1997. However, rather 
than displacing unsubsidised activity, 
the studies modelling showed that 
landholders who had recently been 
subsidised for a project were more 
likely to have subsequently 
completed unsubsidised work. This 
indicates that, at least in terms of 
medium-term economic impact, the 
large increase in public subsidies did 
not diminish privately funded 
activity. 
Independent site verification: 
Aerial photography was used to 
map the extent of revegetation, 
native vegetation fencing and 
restoration on 71 representative 
landholdings in rural south-eastern 
Australia.  
Interviews: Landholders were 
interviewed and the age and 
funding model of each site was 
recorded. 
 
Fisher 
and 
Pakula 
2010 
This study examined the adoption of machinery 
incentives in the central west region of New South 
Wales. 
Project participant responses showed 
that while the majority accelerated 
their practice change as a result of the 
incentive, 73% would have adopted 
these practices within five years 
regardless of the incentive. In 
contrast, 13% of respondents noted 
that they would never have adopted 
these practices without the incentives. 
Interviews: Structured telephone 
interviews with 24 key 
stakeholders, 319 recipients of 
incentives and 21 unsuccessful 
applicants were undertaken. 
Additionally focus groups, a 
desktop review and feedback from 
a workshop presenting project 
findings were also used.  
 
  
Jackson-
Smith et 
al. 2010 
This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of 
using formal USDA Natural Resources Conservation 
Service records of conservation program participation as 
an indicator of spatial and temporal patterns of Best 
Management Practice Implementation and maintenance. 
While over 80% of structural and 
planting BMPs were still in the field, 
less than one-half of the management 
BMPs were still actively being used 
by project respondents.  
Official contract files for each of 
the 90 landowners who 
participated in the program 
between 1992 and 2006 were 
reviewed.  
Interviews: Fifty-five of the 
original 90 participants were 
interviewed.  
Field verification: We shared a 
list of the best management 
practices encouraged in the 
program along with aerial 
photographs of their property and 
reviewed each practice to discover 
whether or not they were still 
using the practice.  
While aerial photographs 
were helpful, particularly to 
verify structural works, 
management practices could 
not be independently 
verified using this method.  
Kammin 
et al. 
2009 
This study was conducted in 1998 in Illinois. It involved 
an evaluation of the Private Land Wildlife Habitat 
Management Program as it functioned from 1986 to 
1996.   
This evaluation found that 
landholders valued site visits from 
state officers or other experts who 
had experience with the practice. It 
also found that landholders generally 
thought that their practice change had 
resulted in a more profound 
ecological change than in fact had 
occurred.  
 
Survey: Self-administered mail 
questionnaire of 34 biologists 
involved in program from 1986 – 
1996. Of the 4,548 participants, 
75% were mailed a survey and 
1,431 responded.  
Site verification: A random 
sample of 101 properties managed 
by program participants were 
selected for on-site evaluations. 
There was a lower than 
expected landholder 
response rate to the survey. 
It is unclear whether the site 
verifications used any data 
to compare site condition 
before the intervention to its 
condition afterwards.  
 
Systematic Reviews 
Rode et 
al. 2013 
This paper reviewed the theoretical insights and empirical 
findings on motivation crowding effects with economic 
instruments for biodiversity protection.  
The most important finding from our review is that several empirical 
studies suggest the existence of motivation crowding effects with 
economic incentives for biodiversity protection, supporting the 
hypothesis that economic instruments can have important impacts on 
relevant motivations and conservation logics.  
  
Rode et 
al. 2014 
The paper seeks to advance our understanding of the 
extent to which the use of economic incentives can 
undermine (‘crowd out’) or reinforce (‘crowd in’) 
people's intrinsic motivations to engage in biodiversity 
and ecosystem conservation.  
This review found that while economic instruments for conservation are 
increasingly being used worldwide, it is crucial to assess existing 
intrinsic motivations and expected changes in people's motivational 
structures prior to large-scale implementation. 
  
  
Surveys 
Andrews 
et al. 2013 
This paper investigated framing effects in 
the context of farmer decision making about 
conservation tillage practices. 
The results suggest the possibility of modest 
financial payments ‘crowding out’ intrinsic 
motivations for contributions to public goods 
such as soil conservation. From a policy 
perspective, these findings also suggest the 
relative inefficacy of offers of modest 
conservation payments in promoting no-till 
farming, especially among non-adopters. 
3 hypotheses were tested using a 
survey-based experiment 
administered to a national sample of 
row-crop farmers. 
 
Burnside 
2005 
This study evaluated the WEST 2000 Plus 
program, undertaken in NSW. 
The evaluation found that there is a declining 
need for investment in NRM works that have 
economic and environmental benefits. Further 
investments in NRM should be the responsibility 
of landholders only unless it can be demonstrated 
that there are substantial off-site benefits and 
impacts. It is evident from the responses to this 
evaluation that considerable investment has 
occurred on properties without WEST 2000 Plus 
funding and that many landholders will make 
further investments. 
149 pastoralists responded to a 
telephone questionnaire. Discussions 
with other stakeholders were also 
undertaken and secondary data and 
information used.  
 
Emtage 
and 
Herbohn 
2012 
 
This study investigated the factors that 
influence landholders to adopt 
recommended practices and use this to 
provide insights into how to encourage 
greater adoption of these practices 
A strong relationship of trust between 
landholders and NRM bodies has been found to 
be crucial in order to achieve large scale 
involvement and behaviour change 
  
Ferraro 
and 
Burnside 
2001 
This paper presents selected outcomes of an 
evaluation of the $17.5 million WEST 2000 
Rural Partnership Program.  
One-off payments are unlikely to be effective if 
repeated interventions are required over time and 
money is a barrier to implementation. This has 
been documented to be the case in western New 
South Wales for rabbit control and woody weed 
control  
Primary data from: A telephone 
survey of randomly selected 
landholders (n = 173), detailed 
discussions with (landholder) grant 
recipients (n = 37), focus group 
meetings involving non-landholder 
stakeholders (n = 40). Secondary 
data i.e. funding applications and 
evaluation sheets and interviews with 
WEST 2000 Staff and Management 
Board  
 
  
Garbach et 
al. 2012 
This study evaluated adoption of 
silvopastoral conservation practices 
(reintroducing trees and shrubs into 
permanent pastures).  
PES payments (Payment for Ecosystem Services) 
increased adoption of practices that provide 
primarily public goods. Practices providing 
primarily private benefits were adopted in the 
absence of PES. Farmer-to-farmer information 
sharing further supported use of conservation 
practices. 
101 farmers were interviewed after 
the RISEMP pilot had closed – 66 
who had received payments and/or 
technical assistance, and 35 who had 
not participated in the program. 
 
Gustafson 
and Hill 
1993  
The objective of this study was to identify 
factors that influence North Dakota CRP 
participants' decisions about future land use.  
It was found that a majority (52 percent) of CRP 
land would be returned to crop production if the 
CRP program was not renewed in 1995. Twenty-
one percent of CRP land would be rented out or 
leased and 18 percent used as pastureland. 
Cross-sectional data from a mail 
survey were used to identify factors 
that are most likely to influence CRP 
land use decisions and to investigate 
relations between land use decisions 
and socioeconomic characteristics. A 
response rate of 39 percent or 351 
participants was obtained from the 
sample size of 900. 
 
Hayes 
2012 
The study examined the sustainability of a 
PES silvopastoral programme in Colombia 
from peasant farmers’ perspectives.  
Participants needed ongoing extension support 
with information and motivation, and couldn’t 
maintain practices that required constant funding. 
When funds for fertiliser ran out, they stopped 
applying it. 
Two surveys were used – one of pilot 
project participants (n=21, total 23) 
and new participants (n=54, total 60).  
 
Hayes et 
al. 2014 
This study examined how PES institutions 
fit with the tenets of adaptive decision-
making for sustainable resource 
management.  
PES programs are not inherently decentralized, 
flexible management tools, as PES contracts tend 
to restrict decision-making rights and offer 
minimal flexibility mechanisms to change 
resource-use practices over the duration of the 
contract period.  
Surveys and replication: Interviews 
with program participants, program 
direction and extension agents of a 
PES carbon offsets program in 
Ecuador, and a silvopastoral program 
in Colombia.  
 
Hoye and 
Bently 
2008 
This study looked at landholder adoption of 
native vegetation management in the Bega 
Valley Shire Area. 
It was found that contract landholders rated 
administration requirements and flexibility in the 
lower bracket, indicating a need for future 
program design to explore landholders’ needs 
and expectations. 
Telephone survey – 250 landholders 
with 5+ Ha, (56 held a native 
vegetation management contract). 
This was 8% of the 2988 landholders 
in region on 5+ Ha.  
 
  
Johnson et 
al. 1997 
This study aimed to examine the effects of 
factors that influence landowners' post-
contract use of CRP lands in the Texas High 
Plains. 
  
The financial value of the commodity base will 
be a significant factor in the post-contract land 
use decision. The probability of acres returning 
to crop production  increased with contract  size. 
69%  of CRP acres would be returned to crop 
production in the absence of an extension of 
current  contracts. 
A mail survey was conducted among 
740 CRP contract holders, who 
represented a stratified sample (by 
location) comprised  of 
approximately 5% of total contract 
holders in the Texas High Plains  
 
Kaljonen 
2006 
This article analyses how implementation 
practices produce conditions for agri-
environmental management.  
The paper discusses poor program designs 
(including the importance of flexibility and of 
recognising local conditions and farmer' 
knowledge).It also discusses additionality. 
Farmers from 31 farms located in 
Finland and enrolled in the general 
protection scheme were interviewed. 
The farms were selected to represent 
different production modes, size, age 
and environmental.  
 
Lambert et 
al. 2006 
This report examines the business, operator, 
and household characteristics of farms that 
have adopted certain conservation-
compatible practices, with and without 
financial assistance from government 
conservation programs.  
The report discusses farmer characteristics of 
involvement in voluntary programs and some 
features of successful programs. 
Authors used crop-specific data from 
the Agricultural Resource 
Management Surveys to examine the 
characteristics of farms that adopt 
conservation management practices. 
A section of the 2001 ARMS survey 
of all farms was used to examine the 
adoption of different practices. 
The data and survey are 
not included in the paper 
so it is difficult to assess 
their quality.  
Läpple 
2010 
This article investigates the determinants 
that affect both adoption and abandonment 
of organic drystock farming over time in 
Ireland.  
Risk-averse farmers are less likely to adopt, 
whereas farmers who express environmental 
concern are more likely to adopt. Farmers are 
most likely to adopt in their ﬁrst year of farming 
and are most likely to exit after the ﬁrst ﬁve-year 
contract expires, suggesting that farmers 
encounter problems with organic farming. 
341 organic, 41 ex-organic and 164 
conventional farmers were surveyed.  
Surveys not included. 
Different surveys used 
for organic farmers and 
conventional farmers.  
Lichtenber
g and 
Smith-
Ramírez, 
2011 
This paper examines the extensive margin 
effects of conservation cost sharing using 
farm-level data from Maryland. 
It was found that cost sharing provides incentives 
for farmers to use conservation methods they 
would find unattractive without the financial help 
of cost sharing. With regard to slippage, farmers 
who received cost sharing allocated 50 
percentage points less total farmland to 
vegetative cover than they would have in the 
absence of cost sharing. 
Survey of 487 Maryland farm 
operators. Stratified random 
sampling was used to ensure a 
sufficient number of responses from 
commercial operations 
 
  
Moon and 
Cocklin 
2011 
This study aimed to understand landholders’ 
motivations and barriers to conserve 
biodiversity, by interviewing 45 landholders 
involved in such programs in Queensland.  
Results showed that changes to land management 
practices speciﬁed in the program should be 
developed with landholders to ensure that they 
are achievable and will provide the desired 
ecological outcomes. Observable improvements 
in land condition can be a powerful stimulus for 
behaviour change. Flexible programs carry the 
attendant risk of achieving low additionality. 
Invitations were sent to program 
participants and 45 respondents (a 
response rate of 78%) was achieved. 
Interviews were conducted face to 
face or via telephone.  
Given the small, selective 
sample of landholders 
interviewed in this 
research, it is likely that 
additional barriers to 
participation exist.  
Morris et 
al. 2000 
This study aimed to understand farmers’ 
attitudes towards and willingness to 
participate in the Arable Field Margins 
option of the Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme. 
Landholders in the CS Scheme found that the 
field margins option was difficult to understand, 
introduce and maintain, and as a result this was 
one of the least successful options in terms of 
uptake, implementation and continuation of 
practice. Landholders placed high value on 
ongoing support from the CS Scheme organisers. 
Survey and replication: Telephone 
Questionnaire designed. Farmers 
were randomly selected from the 
Yellow Pages telephone directory to 
provide coverage from the 
predominantly arable parts of 
England as defined by MAFF 
agricultural statistics. 212 farmers 
interviewed from a range of farming 
types, farm sizes and soil types 
Yellow pages as 
sampling tool - criticism 
that it misses 
lifestyle/organic farmers. 
This wasn't the target 
audience so authors claim 
using the yellow pages 
was a valid tool.  
Page and 
Bellotti 
2015 
In this research farmers' values towards on-
farm ecosystem services, motivations and 
perceived impediments to participation in 
conservation programs were identified in 
two local land services regions in Australia 
using surveys. 
The study examines mainly participation, not 
ongoing NRM practice change, but it does 
discuss the impacts of legislative uncertainty 
regarding a carbon price. 
91 surveys of landholders used in 
final sample. Sample strategy: A 
voluntary online survey. Email 
invitations containing the link to the 
survey were sent to approximately 
800 farmers through Central West 
Farming Systems (CWFS) and 
EverGraze®.  
 
Race and 
Curtis 
2013 
This paper examined how best to deliver 
payments for environmental services, and 
considered whether market-based 
instruments (MBI) deliver better outcomes 
than traditional approaches.  
If the change toward ‘best practice’ NRM is 
relatively easy to sustain, of low cost, perceived 
to be successful, and adds value to the property’s 
management, then there is a strong likelihood 
that the commitment can be maintained over the 
long term. Support and grants should be tailored 
to suit different landholder’s needs. Ongoing 
support is important. Programs need flexibility.  
In-depth semi-structured interviews 
with 31 landholders. Purposefully 
stratified sample included farmers 
and non-farmers, from 3 catchments 
in central northern Victoria, where 
there was a diversity of land uses. 
Selection bias - those 
who participated were 
known to/associated with 
the NRM’s.  
  
Sullivan et 
al. 2004 
This report examined whether the impacts 
of CRP enrolment on rural employment and 
businesses, rural population and beginning 
farmers. 
One factor that clearly influences the choice of 
post-CRP land use is the type of cover used when 
the land was in the program. CRP land planted to 
trees was far less likely to be converted to crop 
production upon the contract’s expiration than 
was CRP land planted in grasses and legumes.  
Trends in the geographic distribution 
of CRP land and the characteristics 
of farm operators participating in the 
CRP were analyzed using CRP 
contract data and survey data on farm 
enterprises. A literature review 
detailed some of the known 
environmental and recreation impacts 
of the CRP. 
 
Wilson 
and Hart 
2001 
This paper focuses on the importance of 
possible changes to attitudes of farmers 
participating in the UK’s 
EnvironmentallySensitive Area (ESA) 
scheme and the Countryside Stewardship 
(CS) scheme. 
Key findings are the importance of flexibility, 
extension, monitoring and education. 
200 farms from 2 different districts 
were surveyed in the UK in 1997 
using structured questionnaire 
followed by in-depth interviews. The 
sampling strategy in the two districts 
was similar, with a random survey of 
participants and non-participants and 
in-depth interviews.  
 
Interviews     
Bowyer and 
Heath 2009 
This study aimed to understand the role 
that a financial grant and technical support 
played in the ‘Profitable perennials’ 
project undertaken in Western Australia 
had on participants’ adoption of perennial 
pastures. 
The grant played a key role in involving farmers 
in the project and quickly leading them to 
trialling perennial pastures. It reduced the risk of 
implementing perennial pastures by reducing the 
capital outlay required for establishment. The 
technical support provided farmers access to a 
broad information network that allowed them to 
learn quickly about perennial pastures. The 
impact of the project on long-term adoption was 
difficult to assess because most participants had 
only just established pastures. 
Semi structured interviews 
with 17 landholders were 
undertaken. Interview guide 
used and included in Appendix 
‘Purposeful sampling’ 
technique used – landholders 
selected from 3 different areas 
in a geographic spread across 
the region.  
Because 100 per cent of the 
project participants were not 
interviewed, it is possible that 
not all viewpoints or ideas 
have been captured through 
this study.  
Karali et al. 
2014 
This paper identifies the factors that either 
constrain or facilitate farmer decisions to 
participate in environmental management 
practices in Switzerland.  
Seventeen factors were found to influence farmer 
decisions to participate in environmental 
management practices, demonstrating that their 
decisions were not solely driven by economic 
incentives.  
The study is based on a 
qualitative, thematic analysis 
of in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews of 24 respondents. 
Respondents were selected 
using a theoretical sampling 
method from a purposeful 
sample. 
 
  
Posthumus 
and Morris 
2010 
This paper examined farmers’ opinions 
about CAP-reform, from successful 
interventions that aimed to reduce soil 
erosion and diffuse pollution, and also 
from failures.  
This article is more on factors that influence 
adoption rather than long term practice change, 
but some useful findings, including the need for 
flexible rules to enable farmers to adapt practices 
on their farm, the possibilities of slippage and 
additionality, and actively involving landholders 
with trials. 
Semi-structured interviews 
were held with 36 farmers. 
Replication: By selecting sub-
catchments with a geographical 
spread, a variety of land 
management situations were 
accounted for. A stakeholder 
workshop was attended by 23 
stakeholders  
The sample of farmer 
interviewees was small, locally 
focussed and thus not 
representative for the entire 
farming population in the UK.  
Reimer et 
al. 2012 
A qualitative analysis of in-depth 
interviews with farmers was conducted to 
determine which characteristics make four 
common BMPs more or less acceptable to 
agricultural producers.  
The four practices include two management/ 
operational practices (cover crops and 
conservation tillage) and two structural practices 
(grassed waterways and ﬁlter strips).The multiple 
benefits of implementing and maintaining grassed 
waterways were highly observable and worked to 
increase enthusiasm and commitment to the 
practice. Observable benefits included reduced 
soil erosion, increased presence of wildlife and 
enhanced aesthetic quality of the waterway 
Interviews were conducted 
with forty-five producers in 
two watersheds in Indiana, 
USA.  
The sample was primarily 
production-focused farms 
producing cash grains and 
soybeans. Smaller hobby farms 
and farms growing non-
commodity crops may have 
very different views of practice 
characteristics. 
Schenk et 
al. 2007 
The objective of the study was to 
determine which conditions and factors 
inﬂuence acceptance positively or 
negatively.  
It was found that those affected should be given 
the possibility to participate in an early phase of 
the planning process. Those affected should be 
informed about planned measures as early as 
possible. Information should not be seen as a 
troublesome duty, but as a cornerstone. 
Replication: two different 
conservation measures were 
studied. Interviews: 22 people 
representing the following 
groups were interviewed in an 
iterative procedure: land owner 
(3), farmer (16), nature 
conservationist (1), local 
politician (2) and 
representative of the tourist 
industry (2). Sampling: The 
interviewees were theoretically 
sampled so that those selected 
included people have a 
representative sample.  
In a qualitative approach the 
aim is not to obtain a 
representative sample, but 
rather to gain insights into the 
subject. Therefore only a small 
number of individuals were 
interviewed. 
Storz 2008 The study examined the Farm Bill 
Conservation Program using an informal 
interview process.  
It was found that participants need low cost 
programs with flexibility, uncomplicated 
practices. Additionality was discussed. 
Landholder interviews using a 
modified sondeo methodology.  
 
  
Tennent 
and Lockie 
2013 
This article reviews the outcomes of three 
projects that targeted biodiversity 
conservation on agricultural land in 
Central Queensland. 
This study suggests that while short-term and 
targeted environmental goals were achieved, 
arguably the most important outcomes of these 
projects were their capacity to build support 
networks, foster communication between natural 
resource management agency staff and 
landholders, and promote a greater appreciation 
for the relationships between biodiversity and 
productivity  
Semi-structured, qualitative 
interviews with 13 land 
managers, 12 project officers 
and 3 community stakeholders 
was undertaken. Interviewees 
were selected on the basis of 
their involvement with one of 
the three projects and their 
willingness to participate in the 
study conducted on published 
academic and industry 
research. 
 
Van 
Herzele et 
al. 2011 
The paper sets out to examine the 
mechanisms by which mobilisation for 
agri-environmental management develops. 
The study follows AEM along the various 
trajectories of implementation (design, 
distribution, application).  
During March/June and 
November 2008, semi-
structured interviews were 
conducted with 13 experts 
involved in AEM 
implementation, as well as 37 
farmers who have practical 
experience with AEM.  
 
No methods section 
Burmeister 
et al. 2006 
This report presents the opinions of 
landholders who took part in a trial 
program.  
This study demonstrated the value of the annual 
reporting process and the importance of 
observing improvements in vegetation condition. 
The majority of landholders indicated that they 
would voluntarily continue to apply the 
management actions or at least continue to forego 
existing land uses such as grazing by stock, 
beyond their contract period 
Surveys with a control were 
used, along with landholder 
annual reports and some site 
visits. But these were 
undertaken by consultants and 
not available in the report. 
It was difficult to assess the 
study design given the lack of 
detail in the report. The study 
did not look at long term 
results and landholders only 
reported on changes during 
program while receiving 
payments, not after payments 
ceased.  
  
Curtis et 
al. 2009  
This study was an evaluation of Southern 
Rivers Bush Incentives Program.  
Site visits by Project Officers were strongly 
welcomed by landholders and were considered to 
be one of the most beneficial aspects of the 
program. Time for basic extension was limited, a 
constraint of the program. Project Officers got 
around this by encouraging landholders to 
accompany them while they did a site assessment 
and even to help the in data collection on plots.  
No methods section.  Authors appear to have been 
the staff who were project 
officers on the program using 
data collected during the 
program. Not an independent 
evaluation, could give rise to 
some conflict of interest. 
Earl et al. 
2005 
The authors were contracted to provide an 
evaluation of the RLS Sustainable 
Agriculture Project in its initial phase. This 
report contains information gathered from 
the evaluation.   
In our view the familiarity of project staff with 
landholders was beneficial to the process, with 
negotiations proceeding from a firm basis of 
trust. It is recommended that in the future a range 
of baseline measurements be recorded at the 
commencement of projects.  
This report contains 
information and findings from 
an evaluation of the RLS 
Sustainable Agriculture Project 
in its initial phase from January 
2005 to June 2005.  
It was difficult to assess the 
methods given that the 
evaluation was not available.  
Windle et 
al. 2007 
This study examined details of a 
Queensland conservation auction, including 
its design and outcomes.  
The study discussed problems with having a short 
term contract for long term goals, along with 
additionality. 
No methods section in the 
paper.  
The paper lists the survey as an 
appendix but this not attached 
to the main report. A link to 
the appendix online no longer 
active. 
Zammit 
2013 
This study examines two Tasmanian 
programs that have engaged with over 1400 
landowners.  
Landowner appreciation that their land had both 
production and commercial conservation values 
grew. The ﬂow of information to build capacity 
through improved awareness, knowledge 
transfers and skills development. Participation 
encouraged many landholders to redesign their 
properties into production and conservation zones 
that supported improved management for both 
productive and conservation outcomes. 
No methods section in the 
paper.  
The researchers reported on 
their experiences in engaging 
private landholders in 2 large 
market based conservation 
projects in Tasmania. 
  
Other     
Roberts 
and 
Lubowski 
2007 
The study examined the persistence of 
cropland retirements induced by the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),  the 
largest U.S. conservation program.   
It found the likelihood of a parcel returning to 
crop production is associated with the 
profitability of cropping activities and of 
alternative land uses,  land cover contracted 
under CRP, land attributes, and location. 
Researchers analysed micro 
data on land use for the 48 
states during periods before 
and after the expiration of the 
first set of CRP contracts. The 
data reflect choices made by 
landowners who opted out of 
the CRP early, or who chose 
not to renew their contract.  
 
 
